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Introduction
Discontent with democracy has gone into new heights in the wake of the Euro-crisis, 
the indignados and the Occupy movements. Read as symptoms of democratic 
stagnation, such recent events have yielded lively debates on the limits of democracy, 
propelling reflections on political change to the forefront of theoretico-political 
analysis. In this context, it comes as little surprise that theories of radical democracy 
have taken a lead in laying out the contours of another, more democratic, world. Their 
attention to division, contestability and openness has placed them in the unique 
position of offering accounts of change that combine robust critiques of the 
exclusions and antagonisms publicised by the Occupy movements (socio-economic, 
institutional and representative) with the insistence that an alternative is possible 
without compromising difference and openness. 
To grasp the intricacies of this combination it is important to notice that the account 
of political change outlined by radical democrats is filtered through the ontological 
presupposition of a constitutive or ‘radical difference’ that dissects and subverts 
orders considered fixed, consensual or universal (Tønder and Thomassen, 2005). This 
suggests that change is envisaged in terms that are neither too thick (so that it foists 
closure on politics) nor too thin (so that it simply assents to the status quo). Rather, 
change is itself configured as a process, sometimes even as a political project, that 
emerges out of, dwells on, and remains open to ongoing challenges by difference – 
whether this difference is conceived as a constitutive antagonism (in Žižek 2011 , 
Laclau and Mouffe 2001); the multitude (Hardt and Negri 2012); the inexistent 
(Badiou 2012) or the part-of-no part (Rancière 1999). Indeed, the different accounts 
of radical difference indicate not just that we are confronting often sharp divisions 
2within trajectories of radical democracy, as Tønder and Thomassen highlight, but also 
that we are dealing with a rather large pool of radical democrats – even theorists who 
eschew the term ‘radical democracy’ (Žižek 2011, pp.392-3), advocate an ‘absolute’, 
non-representative, democracy (Hardt and Negri, 2012) or insist on communism 
instead of democracy (Badiou, 2012). 
No doubt, one can retort that the very rejection of democracy and its institutions, 
coupled with the sharp divisions within the field apropos of the modalities of political 
change hollow out ‘radical democracy’ as an umbrella term. This objection is valid if 
one confines radical democracy to the pluralisation and extension of democratic 
struggles within the frame of liberal democratic institutions - in other words, to 
Laclau and Mouffe’s work (2001) where the term has found its most eloquent 
expression. However, if by ‘radical democracy’ one understands a strand of political 
theory held together by a set of ontological, often post-structuralist, presuppositions 
on the irreducibility of difference in accounts of politics and by a pronounced concern 
with the ways in which popular struggles, many and bottom-up, enframe alternatives 
that unravel dominant scripts – disrupting and changing these – then both the large 
pool of theorists and the divisions between them make more sense. 
On this account of radical democracy, agonistic theory which the books under review 
expound to varying degrees, illustrates one distinctive line of thought. Developed over 
the course of two decades in the work of Chantal Mouffe, Bonnie Honig, William 
Connolly and James Tully, agonistic theory sets out an account of political change 
that displays nuanced differences from other vocabularies of radical democracy. Like 
these vocabularies, agonistic theory stresses the irreducibility of difference in 
accounts of democracy and the invaluable role that popular struggles play in eliciting 
socio-political change (particularly social movements). Unlike other vocabularies of 
radical democracy, however, agonistic theory ties political change with the modality 
of democratic renewal – rather than transformation (Žižek, 2011; Badiou, 2012; Hardt 
and Negri, 2012) or reactivation (Wolin, 1996; Rancière, 1999). 
The idea of the agon is lodged at the centre of the agonistic account of renewal. 
Understood as a moderate, respectful and ongoing type of contest, the agon elicits 
renewal partly because it encourages democratic openness and partly because it 
3sustains it. Agonistic contests enable democratic openness by giving expression to 
constitutive differences suppressed or silenced within pluralistic democracies. They 
sustain openness by exposing and challenging the closures, normalisations and 
exclusions produced by institutional democracies. They disturb their fixities and they 
pluralise – open up, expand and extend – the perspectives, practices, norms and sites 
of democratic politics. Agonistic contests, thus, renew contemporary democracies in a 
specific sense: they rework their dominant facets, continuously opening them up. 
They neither transform (in the sense of overturning) nor reactivate the institutional, 
representative and liberal dimensions of contemporary democracies.
This explains why the agonistic account of renewal has often been dismissed in 
relevant discussions in the broader literature. While the idea of pluralisation and its 
relation with contestation has often been used to distinguish agonistic theory from 
deliberative democracy and mainstream liberal theory (or meld them together, 
depending on where one stands); the emphasis on renewal has not as often brought 
agonistic theory in contact with theories of radical democracy (Mouffe’s work aside). 
In the few instances that the two have been invoked together it has been to foreground 
either their shared post-structuralist ontology (particularly in the case of Mouffe and 
Connolly) or, simply, their incompatibility (Wingenbach, 2011). 
The books under review suggest that we think twice before we dismiss the agonistic 
account of renewal and its place within the broader horizon of radical democracy. 
While the books by Bonnie Honig, James Tully and Chantal Mouffe re-elaborate on 
ideas first developed in the early 2000s, they also delve deeper into the current 
context, they reassert these ideas, and evoke contrasts with other accounts of radical 
democracy (particularly Honig and Mouffe). As a result of the explicit references and 
sometimes allusions to radical democracy the reader is inclined to reflect on the 
exchange between agonism and trajectories of radical democracy – a reflection that 
Mark Wenman’s book , especially his critique of the agonistic account of renewal, 
strongly invites. 
This reflection is taken up in the first and last parts of the review. In particular, the 
first section outlines the agonistic account of renewal, setting out the commonalities 
among the agonistic theories of Honig, Tully and Mouffe. At the same time, the first 
4section explores some differences between agonistic theorists and other radical 
democrats, seeking to identify where the radical import of agonistic theory lies. 
Subsequent sections attend to the specific differences between Honig, Tully and 
Mouffe and, thus, provide a fuller account of the type of renewal envisaged by the 
different theorists. Mark Wenman’s interesting attempt to reload agonism by aligning 
its assumptions with the idea of radical initiative is discussed and assessed in the last 
section. 
The Agonistic Account of Democratic Renewal
The preceding discussion suggested that agonistic theorists, in contrast with other 
radical democrats, conceive of political change in the modality of democratic renewal. 
One way to grasp the particularity of the dimension of renewal, as conceived by 
agonistic theorists, is to contrast it with the two modalities of change advanced by 
other radical democrats: transformation  (Žižek, 2011; Badiou, 2012; Hardt and 
Negri, 2012) and reactivation (Wolin, 1996; Rancière, 1999). The contrast is 
analytically useful because it gives a first impression of the range of ideas that the 
books under review take issue with. 
The first idea that emerges to divide agonistic theorists from those radical democrats 
who advocate a transformative politics is that of a radical rupture, a revolutionary 
break from institutional politics that will open the way for a new, more egalitarian, 
society –  designated as communism. While all agonistic theorists disagree with the 
idea of a radical rupture with institutional politics, they give different reasons for their 
disagreement. For Chantal Mouffe in Agonistics a radical break is not required. There 
are other ways to address the limits of contemporary democracies and she suggests a 
Gramscian ‘war of position’ within institutions (134), for a new society fully liberated 
from institutions can never arrive. Divisions, power and antagonisms, constitutive of 
the socio-political field, will not only prevent the arrival of the type of ‘reconciled’ 
society that theorists such as Alain Badiou and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
suggest, but they will also require institutions to tame and turn them into agons (84). 
In the next section I will explain further why Mouffe’s institutional route to change 
does not come down to another approach to transformative politics – as it might be 
readily assumed from her continued insistence since 1985 on the need to construct a 
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to renewal keeps open the possibility of democratic change, this falls short of the 
institutional overturning envisioned by theorists such as Žižek, Badiou and Hardt and 
Negri. 
James Tully agrees with Mouffe that a radical break with institutional democracy is 
not required, but he is less sanguine  about the role that institutions can play in the 
deepening of democratic functions. In Global Citizenship he suggests that an 
alternative way to democratic reform is through everyday struggles that empower 
those subject to relations of governance and, thus, work to ameliorate, deepen and 
renew institutional politics. Along similar lines, Bonnie Honig cites everyday, 
ordinary, struggles as sources of democratic renewal. In Antigone Interrupted, she re-
interprets Antigone as an ordinary political actor and shows how ordinary work of 
repair can have more far-reaching implications for contemporary democracies than 
aspirations to break from and overturn their institutions. It is noteworthy, then, that all 
agonistic theorists insist, first, that it is unnecessary to look to the creation of a new 
society; second, Honig, Tully and Mouffe also suggest that it is possible to renew 
contemporary democracies by engaging in agons that disrupt and open up, but never 
undo, existing institutional politics. 
Mark Wenman ties this approach to renewal with the Arendtian modality of 
augmentation. The modality of augmentation, he elaborates in Agonistic Democracy, 
enframes a particular way of experiencing freedom that ‘simultaneously expands and 
preserves an existing system of authority’ (9). Wenman associates the productive 
dimension of this type of freedom with pronounced features of the agonistic contest. 
Subjects who contest systemic rules do so in a non-dialectical way and from a pre-
juridical position that cannot be subsumed into constituted authority. The agon 
politically subjectifies them and, thus, puts them in a position to genuinely renegotiate 
and alter constituted rules, practices and institutions. However, this renegotiation is 
always an augmentation of existing rules and practices, stresses Wenman. It is not the 
creation of ‘a new set of norms and values into the world, as it were ex nihilo’ (9). 
The Arendtian modality of revolution, as distinct from augmentation, transpires as a 
6theoretical impossibility for agonistic theorists, because the agon only ever expands 
the background rules of liberal and institutional democracy.
To grasp further the reasons behind this theoretical impossibility, it is useful to delve 
into Mouffe’s, Tully’s and Honig’s account of the agon from a slightly different angle 
to Wenman’s. This angle draws attention to the additional feature that the agons are 
conflicts that are moderate and democratic. They are not expressing a pure 
antagonism toward the system, let alone an economic or class-based one as theorists 
such as Badiou (2012) and Žižek (2011) outline. They do away with pure antagonism 
because they are designed to give expression to the various differences of situated 
subjects seeking to improve the frame of liberal democracy. It follows that if agonism 
exemplifies an already limited and democratic expression of difference, it cannot go 
against the institutions of liberal democracy. To radically question the role of 
institutions would be to fall back to a type of conflict that cannot be considered as a 
democratic resource. By contrast, for Badiou and Žižek division and 
proletarianisation permeate contemporary societies so deeply that it is impossible to 
envision a more democratic and equal world without first radically challenging 
ordinary politics – the institutional, liberal, and democratic framework– and, second, 
offering an alternative vision where division ‘acquires the stability of a new form of 
life’ – namely, communism (Žižek, 2011, p. 475).  
To offer an alternative vision, however, in the form of, say, egalitarianism is from an 
agonistic perspective to initiate closure. Egalitarianism is an epiphenomenon of 
agonism for Tully, Honig and Mouffe (Wenman, 2012, 296). It is not the harbinger of 
a better politics, a ‘de-fetishized democracy’ that has done away with the institutional 
mechanisms that reproduce capitalist relations of domination (Žižek, 2011, 450). For 
this reason, the agonistic account of renewal has been criticised for staying too close 
to the liberal status quo – a point that Wenman picks up, as we will see in the last 
section, as does Vázquez-Arroyo in his contribution to Robert Nichols’ and Jakeet 
Singh’s edited collection. 
In particular, Vázquez-Arroyo argues in Freedom and Democracy in an Imperial 
Context that the absence of a ‘sustained analysis of capitalism’ (50) in Tully’s work 
specifically, leads him to bracket out the material context and, thus, the way that 
7contemporary structures of power limit forms of agonistic resistance, circumscribing 
their productive effects. Two main features of contemporary capitalist structures are 
especially irreconcilable with the type of renewal proposed by Tully (and other 
agonistic theorists I add here) according to Vázquez-Arroyo. The first is that they are 
obdurate. Continuously reproduced in practices, capitalist relations ‘structure different 
fields of power’, ‘take the aura of necessity’ and are ‘tacitly allowed to set the limits 
of how [agonistic] freedom can be conceptualised’ (61). Second, Vázquez-Arroyo 
highlights the structural unevenness of politics, the ways that the rules of the game are 
always ‘entrenched to the disadvantage of the have-nots, even if the latter can 
creatively resist them’ (61); and this he suggests requires not just confronting 
capitalist power but also democracy itself which supports it (66). 
To be sure, Vázquez-Arroyo is right to suggest that Tully (and I would add Honig and 
Mouffe) do not theorise differences and contestationsdifferences through the prism of 
economic and capitalist relations. However, Vázquez-Arroyo is wrong to dismiss the 
effects that agonistic contests have on the system. A contrast with those radical 
democrats who suggest the momentary reactivation and subsequent retreat of 
democracy in institutional structures helps to show that something does change, after 
all, as a result of agonistic struggles. The idea of reactivation, prominent in different 
ways in the work of Sheldon Wolin (1996) and Jacques Rancière (1999), assumes that 
there is a clear separation between institutional politics (conceived of as hierarchical 
and , administrative, continuous and obdurate) and popular struggles (conceived of as 
anarchic, egalitarian and momentary). This separation entails that when popular 
struggles erupt, seeking to transgress the norms, forms and practices from which they 
are excluded, democracy becomes reactivated. This reactivation, that gives focus to 
ordinary people, the have-nots in the case of Rancière (1999), is only exceptional 
however, in the sense of being only temporarily transgressive. As soon as the 
democratic struggle has ended, democracy retreats – subsumed into institutions and 
administration. 
Contrasted with the agonistic approach to renewal, this account of change keeps open 
the possibility for a radical initiative, but bars the prospect of a break from 
institutions. It recognises the obduracy of institutional structures, but reduces the 
experience of democracy as a form of political subjectification to a moment.   
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agon is ongoing and atelic and there is at least one serious merit to this insistence. It 
evades lamentation and grievability (for the democracy gone), a dangerous recourse, 
as Honig shows in Antigone Interrupted. If politicised, however, and by this Honig 
means rendered agonistic, seen as an ongoing agon seeking to ‘litigate or redress a 
wrong’ (120), then grievability turns to a powerful political resource. Subjects divide, 
take sides and challenge dominant practices and norms. While these practices and 
norms will neither radically transform nor simply return, they might open up and this 
is no small thing (if we think, for example, of discussions about gay marriage). 
Nevertheless, the agonistic account of renewal promises a democratic openness that 
as the discussion has so far intimated, appears to be too little in the face of obdurate, 
capitalist and structural forms of domination. The question then becomes: what is 
radical in agonism? If what issues from an agonistic struggle is only openness, neither 
a radical initiative nor an exceptional politics that at least confronts the obduracy of 
dominant structures, then why isn’t agonism an edgy version of liberalism? I would 
suggest that what differentiates agonism from mainstream liberal theory, at least at 
this level of discussion, is that it accentuates the need for and possibility of an 
alternative, that things can be otherwise if attention is given to the differences that 
dominant or hegemonic orders exclude and silence. At the same time, agonistic theory 
carves out its own account of political change and in situating it within the frame of 
democracy, without turning a blind eye to its limits, points to an alternative that 
breaks the impasse of a democracy either dead or gone. Whether this alternative is 
sufficient will be discussed in the last section. The subsequent sections fill in the 
details of this alternative by discussing further the particular forms it takes in 
Agonistics, Global Citizenship and Antigone Interrupted. 
Unpacking the Differences: Democratic Institutions, Agonism and Renewal
The previous section explored the similarities among the agonistic theories of Honig, 
Tully and Mouffe apropos of the modality of democratic renewal. It laid  emphasis on 
the idea that for agonistic theorists in contrast with other radical democrats, renewal is 
possible within the frame of liberal and institutional democracy. The aim of this 
section is somewhat different. It draws out the differences between Tully, Honig and 
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the key challenge for democracy today, but also on the locus and steps to eliciting 
renewal. Mouffe’s Agonistics will be discussed first. 
Hegemonising Institutions (Mouffe)
Mouffe’s main concern in Agonistics is with neoliberal hegemony. Her aim is to 
identify a strategy for constructing instituting a an alternative, counter-hegemonic  
order . To institute a counter-hegemonic order, that addresses the institutional limits 
of contemporary democracies in such a way that neoliberalism looses its hegemonic 
status. Mouffe call this radical politics needs to develop a strategy ‘of engagement 
with state institutions’. Radical politics, she says, . It cannot envisage a withdrawal 
from institutions the way that theorists such as Hardt and Negri suggest because 
institutions are one key terrain of hegemonic struggle. They can also become a 
vehicle for struggle (76), giving expression to the division and many demands of the 
demos. 
A particular view of the nature of neoliberal hegemony underpins the emphasis that 
Mouffe places on institutions as the locus of renewal – rooted in Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy co-authored with Ernesto Laclau. It suggests that neoliberal 
discourse succeeded in becoming hegemonic by making a series of moves (decisions, 
exclusions, appropriations and neutralisations) in a variety of terrains. If an array of 
moves is, thus, behind the success of neoliberal hegemony – neither a single logic nor 
a veil of ideology; then the first step for a radical politics that seeks to challenge this 
hegemony is to cast light on and expose its moves in the multiplicity of the fields they 
have taken place, including state institutions. Mouffe labels this first step 
‘disarticulation’. It captures the moment of critique thatand contestation that is, 
according to her, necessary to reveals the unnaturalness of the current hegemonic 
order. However, this moment is not sufficient on its own. To foment another, more 
democratic, order the movement of ‘re-articulation’ is just as important, according to 
Mouffe. Re-articulation constitutes the second tenet of the ‘strategy of engagement 
with’. It captures the moment of constructing a counter-hegemonic order – a 
construction that Mouffe ties with the revival of representative functions. and Mouffe 
goes as far as to explicate specific paths to its construction: identifying a narrower 
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adversary than neoliberalism; ‘combining parliamentary with extra-parliamentary 
struggle’; creating ‘a synergy between a plurality of actors’ and ‘launching a war of 
position in a multiplicity of sites’ (75). 
Just as notably, Mouffe’s emphasis on the movement of re-articulation leads her to 
develop a strong defence of representative democracy. On the back of the assumption 
that the problem today has to do with the way that representative institutions function, 
not with representation per se as Hardt and Negri suggest, Mouffe proposes the 
deepening of representative functions and a hegemonisation of party institutions. 
Representative functions are deepened when liberty and equality are better enforced – 
by securing, for example, more inclusive and alternative forms of party representation 
so that citizens feel they have choice and political voice. At the same time, ‘the 
emergence of a genuine left’ party that challenges neoliberalism from within the 
system, can further strengthen representative democracy (120). This is what, in the 
end, Mouffe means by constructing a counter-hegemony hegemonisation in this 
context: renewing our commitment to ‘re-establishing the priority of democratic 
valuesthe values of liberty and equality by securing through institutionalised 
adversarialism (that is, agonism) that they are not hijacked by the one interpretation 
that neoliberalism offers without relinquishing liberal representative institutions’ 
(124).  While this kind of counter-hegemonic construction stops short of a radical 
break, the type of renewal it calls for in terms of left politics, charged with the task of 
recovering the appeal of democratic values within an institutional setting, is for 
Mouffe no less radical than the transformative politics of theorists such as Hardt and 
Negri. On Mouffe’s account, radicalisation comes down to a deepening of 
institutional functions - struggles within and against democratic institutions - and to 
this end, the spread of self organising practices is not sufficient. Therefore, it comes 
as little surprise that the extension of democracy and the spread of self-organising 
practices, which is interestingly what Tully suggests, is not enough for Mouffe.  
Democratic struggles from her perspective need to be played out within and against 
dominant institutions if they are going to have an effect. James Tully thinks 
otherwise. 
Expanding Democracy, or Never Mind the Institutions (Tully)
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In Global Citizenship, Tully affirms the importance of institutional politics, but he 
does not go as far as Mouffe  portraying institutions as the locus of change - in fact, 
the very opposite. Seeking to explore and open up the ‘new field of possibilities of 
another, more democratic world’ (6), Tully redescribes and, in the process, expands 
the very meaning of democracy. 
Redescription is a central dimension of Tully’s approach to public philosophy. Along 
with critique, the calling into question of what appears to be normal, necessary or 
given, redescription elicits a modification of the rules of the democratic game and, in 
so doing, opens up possibilities that these rules have either been repressed or 
foreclosed. by ‘inherited languages of description and reflecti on’ (Tully, 2008, p.19). 
In this respect, redescription can be likened to Mouffe’s re-articulation. Both 
processes supplement critical activity; they rework the limits of prevailing practice 
and, crucially, they create possibilities for another , different, kind of practice. 
However, there is a pronounced difference between the two processes. While re-
articulation initiates creates something anew - therefore, it is no coincidence that 
Mouffe often reverts to the notion of ‘construction’; redescription inscribes something 
differently – therefore, Tully often reverts to the term ‘modification’. Although 
modification might be viewed as a limited objective, its intent and, certainly, effect is 
no less radical than Mouffe’s movement of re-articulation. It profoundly unsettles and 
augments what goes by such taken-for-granted names as ‘democracy’ and 
‘citizenship’. 
In Global Citizenship Tully seeks to decentre the singularity of modern citizenship 
(rights and institutionally based) by redescribing struggles that do not immediately 
meet its criteria as practices of diverse citizenship. At the centre of this redescription 
lies the idea, familiar to the readers of Tully’s earlier work, that diverse citizenship - a 
negotiated, contextualised and ongoing practice – ‘manifests the freedom of and in 
participation, and with fellow citizens’ (39). This idea enframes three propositions. 
The first is that subjects citizenise, that is, they express their freedom of participation 
when they agonistically contest and resist relations of governance – understood here 
in the expansive sense of control and direction. Second, such citizens engage in what 
Tully designates as Spielraum (44-45), an open ended free play with governors, where 
they renegotiate the terms of the governing relation, thereby experiencing their 
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freedom in participation. Third, and as a result of the above, citizenship so modified 
transgresses institutional settings and arises in – or, in fact, extends to - relationships. 
Tully distinguishes between two types of relationship, citizen-governance 
relationships that he views as reciprocal and mutually enabling and citizen-citizen 
relations of civic friendship and mutual trust (for example, social movements, urban 
communes and cooperatives). Citizen-citizen relations and, particularly, cooperatives 
are especially promising for eliciting change, according to Tully. They ‘enact 
alternative worlds’ that embody the very type of change that they want to see in the 
current system (63). Therefore, such alternative communities already travel down the 
road to radical and lasting change and effectively map out its contours.  
Indeed, acting otherwise in a non-violent way is Tully’s alternative to Mouffe’s 
vocabulary of confrontation and ‘war of position’. On the back of the assumption that 
the problem today has to do with the limits of institutional participation – that is, with 
the incapacity of citizens to elicit global reform for such pressing issues as climate 
change, inequalities and global poverty – Tully proposes diverse citizenship as 
another way of being empowered, having a say and experiencing self-government. 
This experience of self-government, of acting otherwise in the here and now, is from 
Tully’s perspective as important to a better democracy as is Mouffe’s emphasis on 
partisanship. 
Nevertheless, acting otherwise draws on different resources to partisanship. As Aletta 
Norval explains, in her contribution to Nichols and Singh’s edited collection, acting 
otherwise starts from ‘a sense of dislocation’ from ‘our’ familiar ways of making 
sense of the world’ (186) and moves on to a negotiation between different ways of 
conceiving the world that opens up and pluralises the possibilities of alternative 
identifications. In this negotiation, both imagination and an embedded sense of 
knowledge play a key role, according to Norval. While imagination, ‘conceived as an 
interpretative act’ (189), helps to identify and make connections between possibilities 
– and is, thus, key to the development of alternatives; an embedded sense of 
knowledge enables the connection between different senses of selfhood or what 
Norval refers to as ‘being able to find one’s way with another’ (196). By contrast, 
partisanship that Mouffe makes the case for draws on the existing ‘grammar’ of 
politics. No less than partisanship, however, acting otherwise remains confined to the 
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frame of liberal democracy – the context it is situated in – and maps out alternatives 
that aim to better it. This mapping is exactly what is missing from Bonnie Honig’s 
account of renewal as the next section shows. 
Pluralising the Agon (Honig)
The discussion has so far suggested that both Tully and Mouffe tie renewal with a 
two-step process that first uncovers and then re-articulates (Mouffe) or redescribes 
(Tully) repressed alternatives.  Bonnie Honig’s account of renewal displays nuanced 
differences from Tully’s and Mouffe’s. While it is also concerned with uncovering 
repressed alternatives, this uncovering only stems from and consists in the 
pluralisation of agonistic practices of dissent and disruption. This subtle difference 
reveals that the type of renewal that issues from Honig’s account is more limited in its 
intent than Tully’s ‘modification’ and Mouffe’s ‘counter-hegemonic construction’, 
since it remains content with the creativity generated by everyday resistances and 
their potential to redirect and expand on institutional democracy. Antigone Interrupted 
attests to and exemplifies this endeavour to align democratic transformation renewal 
with pluralisation and, inevitably, ordinary work of repair.   
Antigone Interrupted is an interesting book because by developing a new reading of 
Sophocles’ play, Honig directly challenges dominant assumptions of radical 
democracy. Antigone, she notes, is ‘a text we take to be radical, a text often taken as 
the founding text of radicalism’ (194), for it is seen to embody the politics of 
dissidence, heroism, lamentation and counter-sovereignty that much Left democratic 
thinking is attached to. To counter these assumptions and reveal another, agonistic 
Antigone, Honig places the play within the context of fifth century burial practices in 
Athens and she suggests that its heroine defends aristocratic practices of burial that 
democratic Athens (represented by Creon) had outlawed. Therefore, Antigone, on this 
reading, does not simply resist Creon’s sovereign power, but also, crucially, she seeks 
to subvert sovereign power while she defends another order. Antigone is, in other 
words, something more than a dissident and a lamenter, according to Honig. She is a 
‘partisan political actor’ (95). Although she laments, her lamentation is itself a 
contested practice, an agon between different orders. At the same time, Honig’s 
reading reveals that Antigone, far from being the lone, heroic, actor that much radical 
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democratic thought celebrates, is conspiratorial and sororal. She plots and seeks to 
mobilise publics. Antigone is thus an ordinary actor through Honig’s lens, and this 
Antigone decisively ‘breaks many theorists fascination with rupture over the 
everyday; powerlessness over sovereignty and heroic martyrdom over the seemingly 
dull work of maintenance, repair and planning for possible futures’ (2). 
The implications of this reading are noteworthy for democratic theory. Certainly, it 
challenges the idea that renewal change will issue from some extraordinary politics, 
not only because such politics is, as I have already mentioned, impossible from an 
agonistic perspective, but also because radical actors (even as famous as Antigone) 
never transgress the divisions constitutive of politics – they ascribe to a cause, defend 
and promote this cause through ordinary means and everyday practices within the 
frame of their existing world. Political actors then, much like Antigone, ‘work on the 
interval’, as Honig puts it following Rancière (146). They stage contests between 
orders, identities and practices and it is the pluralisation of these contests that, in the 
end, renews the institutionally settled democracy. The question then arises of whether 
this type of renewal is enough. The next section delves into Wenman’s work and 
discusses the limits of the agonistic account of renewal.
The Limits of the Agonistic Account of Renewal
The previous section highlighted some differences in the way that Honig, Tully and 
Mouffe approach democratic renewal. These differences issue partly from the 
nuanced strategies they propose: re-articulation (Mouffe), modification (Tully) and 
pluralisation (Honig). The differences also issue from their diagnoses of 
contemporary problems. While for Mouffe the problem is, as we have seen, neoliberal 
hegemony, for Tully it is the inability of ordinary citizens to elicit change through the 
institutional means available to them – it is not neoliberalism tout court. By contrast, 
Honig’s attack on accounts of transformative politics on the one hand and theories of 
grievability on the other, draws attention to the lack of appreciation for the ordinary 
work of institutional repair within contemporary democratic theory. In view of these 
different emphases, Honig, Tully and Mouffe identify three separate, albeit 
complementary, paths to renewal: institutional regeneration (Mouffe), creative 
disruption (Honig) and enactment of an alternative in the here and now (Tully). Are 
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these sufficient, given the limits of contemporary democratic institutions to register, 
let alone address, rampant inequalities and worsening living conditions in their midst? 
This is the question that the present section addresses and a good starting point here is 
Mark Wenman’s thought provoking book Agonistic Democracy: Constituent Power 
in the Era of Globalisation. 
In Agonistic Democracy Wenman is dissatisfied with the agonistic account of 
renewal. What Wenman finds particularly dissatisfying in agonism is not the theory 
per se – after all, he stages a debate within, not against, agonism – but the fact that it 
forecloses the possibility of ‘new beginnings that might discontinue the basic social 
and political forms of modern liberal democratic constitutionalism’ (264). Wenman 
suggests that agonistic theory must take this possibility into account – which he ties 
with the Arendtian modality of revolution – if it is to avoid complicity with the status 
quo. Besides, current conditions of domination call for a ‘more militant stance’ 
towards institutional democracy and to develop this stance agonism needs to engage 
in a more forthcoming critique of liberal democracy. 
Seeking, then, to move agonism to the direction of such critique, Wenman reworks 
the idea of revolution and suggests that understood as the human capacity for 
creation, revolution can be made compatible with agonism. There is nothing in the 
agonistic account of pluralism, tragedy and conflict – the defining features of 
agonistic theory according to Wenman – that contradicts a focus on the ways in which 
new principles might be created out of the agon. At the same time, Wenman finds in 
the agonistic emphasis on transnational social movements a mainstay that, if taken 
further, can incorporate the modality of revolution.  
Transnational social movements, he argues, often exhibit the capacity for creation that 
the idea of revolution denotes. Agonistic theorists praise such movements and, 
crucially, link them ‘to the possibility of new forms of cosmopolitanism (Mouffe 
aside)’ (269). Wenman further strengthens this link and he proposes a militant 
cosmopolitanism ‘concerned with the capacity of democratic actors to generate new 
social and political forms subsequently recognised to be of wider significance, so that 
they are picked up and carried forward by different actors and spectators in different 
locales and become the foundation of an expanding open-ended form of universality’ 
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(270). On this account, agonistic contests spring from militant conviction and couple 
with the exercise of agonistic judgement. While militant conviction serves as source 
of new values, the judgement of varied spectators helps to identify and universalise 
the new initiatives brought into existence. Universality, as Wenman understands it 
here, is not the same asdenotes  impartiality.  Rather, it is an agonism of reciprocal 
judgements –an ongoing ‘dispute about the status of particular acts’ (280) – an 
agonism of reciprocal judgements - that, mediated by post-sovereign leadership, holds 
open the door to initiating and augmenting new norms and principles. Does 
Wenman’s militant cosmopolitanism transgress the limits of agonistic augmentation? 
No doubt, Wenman’s book invites the reader to reflect on the Janus face of the agon: 
its genuinely renewing effects and reiteration of liberal democracy. In so doing, he 
sharply shows that what appears, in the first instance, to be a pragmatic way of 
deepening contemporary politics turns out, on closer inspection, to be limiting – in 
view of the challenges confronting contemporary liberal democracies.. Liberal 
democracy is seriously under strain today because of rampant inequalities and the 
consolidation of neoliberal policies. In this context, the idea that an ongoing agon 
only expands what there is transpires as insufficient. The question then becomes 
whether a militant cosmopolitanism overcomes the limits of agonistic theory. 
Wenman does a good job in showing, first, that augmentation and revolution are not 
opposites and, second, that the modality of revolution, understood as the human 
capacity for creation, can credibly constitute a tenet of agonistic theory. However, he 
so convincingly recasts agonism that it can be questioned whether, in the end, his 
account of militant cosmopolitanism transgresses the limits of agonism. If the 
exercise of judgement, that new initiatives hinge on, remains open and ongoing, then 
this account of judgement is in a sense already latent in agonistic theory – in that 
agonistic contests have unavoidably been judged as worthy enough to be taken up. 
While democratic augmentation is not anymore the only option for agonistic contests, 
it is unclear how (and what kind) of) new ideas will emerge to challenge and unsettle 
the dominant order. 
Following Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2007) analysis of the ‘third spirit of capitalism’, 
I would suggest that the limit today might have less to do with the emergence absence 
of new ideas and initiatives and more with the absorption and co-optation of the ideas 
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and initiatives that there are by a networked capitalism. If this is the case, then 
perhaps the agonistic way of addressing the limits of the current order, with its 
emphasis on openness, underestimates the hurdles involved in securing a more 
democratic order. To overcome these hurdles, it is necessary, as Boltanski and 
Chiapello remind us, to revive the social critique – based on claims to social and 
economic equality – alongside the critique of the closures, normalisations and 
hegemonies of the current order. Despite their contradictions, both critiques need to 
be kept alive, if the excesses that each one risks on its own are to be avoided (2007, 
536) and a more equal and democratic world is to emerge. 
 an alternative, such as egalitarianism, needs not just to be initiated and brought to the 
fore, but also, crucially, proclaimed and endorsed. Of course, to endorse 
egalitarianism is, as we have seen, to close off the agon according to agonistic 
theorists – Wenman included - to promote a good other than openness. But still, if 
openness, comes down to a good (and this is no small thing), then perhaps 
egalitarianism and a more democratic, not just liberal, world is the price to be paid. 
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